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Flat or non-concentrating module prices have dropped 
as module efficiencies have increased. Prices are in 
1985 dollars for large quantities of commercial products. 
Typical module lifetimes were less than 1 year but 
are now estimated to be greater than 10 years. 
(Ten-year warranties are now available.) 
Technology advancement in crystalline silicon solar cells 
and modules (non -concentrating). 
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) funded the now 
operational silicon refinement production plant with 
1200 MT/year capacity. DOE/FSA-sponsored efforts 
were prominent in the UCC process research 
and development. 
A Block l module (fabricated in 1975), held in front of four 
Block V modules, represents the progress of an 11-year effort. 
The modules, designed and manufactured by industry to FSA 
specifications and evaluated by FSA, rapidly evolved during 
the series of module purchases by DOEIFSA. 
The automated machine interconnects solar cells 
and places them for module assembly. The second- 
generation machine made by Kulicke and Soffa was 
cost shared by Westinghouse Corporation and DOE/FSA. 
More technology advancements of the 
coop era tive indus try/university/ 
DOE/FSA efforts are shown on the 
inside back cover. Use of modules in 
photovoltaic power systems are shown 
on the outside back cover. 
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Abstract 
The Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA) Project, funded by the U.S. Government and managed by the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, was formed in 1975 to develop the modulelarray technology needed to attain widespread terrestrial 
use of photovoltaics by 1985. To accomplish this, the FSA Project established and managed an Industry, Univer- 
sity, and Federal Government Team to perform the needed research and development (R&D). 
PA&I performed planning and integration activities to support management of the various FSA Project R&D 
activities. Technical and economic goals were established by PA&I for each R&D task within the Project to coor- 
dinate the thrust toward the National Photovoltaics Program goals. 
A sophisticated computer modeling capability was developed to assess technical progress toward meeting the 
economic goals. These models included a manufacturing facility simulation [Solar Array Manufacturing Industry 
Costing Standards (SAMICS)], a photovoltaic power station simulation [Lifetime Cost and Performance (LCP)] and a 
decision aid model incorporating uncertainty [SIMulation of Research ANd Development Projects (SIMRAND)]. This 
family of analysis tools was used to track the progress of the technology and to explore the effects of alternative 
technical paths. Numerous studies conducted by PA&I signaled the achievement of milestones or were the foundation 
of major FSA Project and National Program decisions. 
This document summarizes the most important PA&I activities during the Project's history. It discusses the PA&I 
planning function and how it related to Project direction and reviews important analytical models developed by PA&I 
for its analytical and assessment activities. The document summarizes major studies completed during the term of the 
Project and provides considerable insight into the role played by PA&I in supporting Project management. 
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Foreword 
Throughout U.S. history, the Nation’s main source of energy has changed from wood to coal to petroleum. It is 
inevitable that changes will continue as fossil fuels are depleted. Within a lifetime, it is expected that most U.S. energy 
will come from a variety of sources, including renewable energy sources, instead of from a single type of fuel. More 
than 30% of the energy consumed in the United States is used for the generation of electricity. The consumption of 
electricity is increasing at a faster rate than the use of other energy forms and this trend is expected to continue. 
come. It uses solar cells to generate electricity directly from sunlight, cleanly and reliably, without moving parts. 
Photovoltaic (PV) power systems are simple, flexible, modular, and adaptable to many different applications in an 
almost infinite number of sizes and in diverse environments. Although photovoltaics is a proven technology that is 
cost-effective for hundreds of small applications, it is not yet cost-effective for largescale utility use in the United 
States. For widespread economical use, the cost of generating power with photovoltaics must continue to be 
decreased by reducing the initial PV system cost, by increasing efficiency (reduction of land requirements), and by 
increasing the operational lifetime of the PV systems. 
fuel sources and ever-increasing prices for petroleum, led the US. Government to initiate a terrestrial PV research and 
development (R&D) project. The objective was to reduce the cost of manufacturing solar cells and modules. This 
effort, assigned to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, evolved from more than a decade-and-a-half of spacecraft PV power- 
system experience and from recommendations of a conference on Solar Photovoltaic Energy held in 1973 at Cherry 
Hill, New Jersey. 
This Project, originally called the LowCost Solar Array Project, but later known as the Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA) 
Project, was based upon crystalline-silicon technology as developed for the space program. During the 1960s and 
1970s, it had been demonstrated that photovoltaics was a dependable electrical power source for spacecraft. In this 
time interval, solarcell quality and performance improved while the costs decreased. However, in 1975 the costs were 
still much too high for widespread use on Earth. It was necessary to reduce the manufacturing costs of solar cells by a 
factor of approximately 100 if they were to be a practical, widely used terrestrial power source. 
The FSA Project was initiated to meet specific cost, efficiency, production capacity, and lifetime goals by R&D in all 
phases of flat-plate module (nonconcentrating) technology, from solarcell silicon material purification through verifica- 
tion of module reliability and performance. 
Photovoltaics, a promising way to generate electricity, is expected to provide significant amounts of power in years to 
In the early 1970s, the pressures of the increasing demand for electrical power, combined with the uncertainty of 
The FSA Project was phased out at the end of September 1986. 
iv 
Acknowledgments 
The following Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) staff members have contributed significantly to the Project Analysis 
and Integration (PA&I) activity: P. McGuire (Area Manager), W. Callaghan, P. Henry, and H. Macomber (former Area 
Managers), B. Jackson, R. Chamberlain, R. Aster, R. Daniel, C. Borden, and R. Miles. Former JPL staff members who 
contributed to the early PA&I efforts include: P. Firnett, and J. Doane. The contribution of M. Alper, who conceived 
the idea of an independent PA&I activity, also is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 
This document reports on work done under NASA Task RE-152, Amendment 41 9, DOE/NASA IAA No. 
i 
DE-A1 01 -85CE89008. 
V 
FSA Project Summary 
The Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA) Project, a Government-sponsored photovoltaic (PV) project, was initiated in 
January 1975 with the intent to stimulate the development of PV systems for economically competitive, large- 
with 10% energy conversion efficiency, a 20-year lifetime, and a selling price of $0.50/Wp (in 1975 dollars). The 
key achievement needed was cost reduction in the manufacture of solar cells and modules. 
As manager, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory organized the Project to meet the stated goals through research and 
development (R&D) in all phases of flatplate module technology, ranging from silicon-material refinement through 
verification of module reliability and performance. The Project sponsored parallel technology efforts with periodic pro- 
gress reviews. Module manufacturing cost analyses were developed that permitted cost-goal allocations to be made 
for each technology. Economic analyses, performed periodically, permitted assessment of each technical option’s 
potential for meeting the Project goal and of the Project’s progress toward the National goal. Only the most promising 
options were continued. Most funds were used to sponsor R&D in private organizations and universities, and led to 
an effective Federal Government-University-Industry Team that cooperated to achieve rapid advancement in PV 
technology. 
vation, a leveling of energy prices, and decreased Government emphasis had altered the economic perspective for 
photovoltaics. The US. Department of Energy’s (DOE’S) National Photovoltaics Program was redirected to longer- 
range research efforts that the private sector avoided because of higher risk and longer payoff time. Thus, FSA con- 
centrated its efforts on overcoming specific critical technological barriers to high efficiency, long life, reliability, and 
low-cost manufacturing. 
To be competitive for use in utility central-station generation plants in the 199Os, it is estimated that the price of 
voltaics Research Plan involving both increased cell efficiency and module lifetime. Area-related costs for PV utility 
plants are significant enough that flat-plate module efficiencies must be raised to between 13 and 17%, and module 
life extended to 30 years. Crystalline silicon, research solar cells (nonconcentrating) have been fabricated with more 
than 20% efficiency. A full-size experimental 15% efficient module also has been fabricated. It is calculated that a 
multimegawatt PV power plant using largevolume production modules that incorporate the latest crystalline silicon 
technology could produce power for about $0.27/kWh (1985 dollars). It is believed that $0.17/kWh (1985 dollars) is 
scale terrestrial use. The Project’s goal was to develop, by 1985, the technology needed to produce PV modules I 
I 
Excellent technical progress led to a growing participation by the private sector. By 1981, effective energy conser- 
I 
I 
W-generated power will need to be $0.1 7lkWh (1985 dollars). This price is the basis for a DOE Five-Year Phot@ 1 
i 
1 
I 
I achievable, but only with a renewed and dedicated effort. 
Government-sponsored efforts, plus private investments, have resulted in a small, but growing terrestrial PV in 
dustry with economically competitive products for stand-alone PV power systems. A few megawatt-sized, utility- 
connected, PV installations, made possible by Government sponsorship and tax incentives, have demonstrated the 
technical feasibility and excellent reliability of large, multimegawatt PV power-generation plants using crystalline sili- I 
con solar cells. I 
Major FSA Project Accomplishments 
Established basic technologies for all aspects of the manufacture of nonconcentrating, crystallinesilicon PV 
modules and arrays for terrestrial use. Module durability also has been evaluated. These resulted in: 
I 
Reducing PV module prices by a factor of 15 from $75/Wp (1985 dollars) to $5MP (1 985 dollars). 
Increasing module efficiencies from 5 to 6% in 1975 to more than 15% in 1985. 
0 Stimulating industry to establish 1 0-year warranties on production modules. There were no warranties in 1975. 
Establishing a new, low-cost high-purity silicon feedstock-material refinement process. 
Establishing knowledge and capabilities for PV moduldarray engineeringldesign and evaluation. 
Establishing long-life PV module encapsulation systems. 
Devising manufacturing and lifecycle cost economic analyses. 
I 
~ 
Transferred technologies to the private sector by interactive activities in research, development, and field 
demonstrations. These included 256 R&D contracts, comprehensive module development and evaluation efforts, 
26 Project Integration Meetings, 10 research forums, presentations at hundreds of technical meetings, and ad- 
visory efforts to industry on specific technical problems. 
Stimulated the establishment of a viable commercial PV industry in the United States. 
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Project Analysis and Integration Summary 
The Project Analysis and Integration (PA&I) Area was formed as part of the original Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA) 
Project. Its function was to provide analyses needed to guide the Project’s technical development toward achieve- 
ment of the National Photovoltaics Program’s goals, and to serve as a communication link between the various areas 
of the FSA Project and other elements of the National Photovoltaics Program. PA&I fulfilled these objectives by sup- 
porting Project management with information needed for planning and decision-making, by developing analytical 
models used to assess technical progress, by preparing key studies used to set the direction for Project activities, and 
by operating an information exchange program that interacted in varying degrees with every other element of the FSA 
Project and the National Program. 
PA&I played a significant role in planning throughout the Project’s history, reflecting the emphasis placed on 
economic performance in measuring progress. During the last half of the 1970s, PA&I helped reformulate original Pro- 
gram goals to reflect what had been learned about photovoltaic (PV) technology and to expand it to include concen- 
trator PV technology, tests and demonstration plans, and a broadening of scope to cover commercialization and industri- 
alization goals. In 1979, PA&I developed a detailed Project plan describing the path to technical readiness in 1982. This 
plan guided Project activity during its most active years. More recently, PA&I was involved in planning for the remaining 
years of the Project when the National Program emphasized potentially large payoff, high-risk technology developed for 
long-term industry use. 
PA&I developed several important models used to support the planning and decision-making activities of Project 
management. The most important model, Solar Array Manufacturing Industry Costing Standards (SAMICS), is a detailed 
manufacturingcost model, supported by a complete overhead cost structure and an extensive cost-account catalog. 
SAMICS has been used to prepare consistent and reliable moduleproduction cost estimates for technical options during 
most of the Project’s history. Another important model developed by PAM, SlMulation of Research ANd Development 
(SIMRAND), is a Monte Carlo simulation model with the capacity to analyze complex research and development (R&D) 
decisions involving uncertain information. The SIMRAND model was used successfully to compare the various technical 
options supported by the National Program. The final major model developed was Lifetime Cost and Performance (LCP), 
which is a simulation model for estimating the output, costs, and revenues of a PV system over its lifetime. LCP can 
model the performance of a PV system in a specific application involving the exact conditions of diverse geographical 
locations. LCP has been used to explore many application issues including operation and maintenance schedules and 
tracking configurations. 
PA&I prepared several significant studies during the Project’s tenure to assess the status of the technology, to deter- 
mine the potential economic status of various options, and to illustrate reasonable courses of action for reaching the 
Project goals. The first thorough application of the SAMICS methodology was in preparation of the “Economic Analysis 
of a Candidate $0.50/Wp Flat-Plate Photovoltaic Manufacturing Technology.” The study showed, for the first time, that a 
silicon-ribbon technology had the economic capability to meet the Project goals. The first attempt to set guidelines for 
the development of individual aspects of the technology was the “Price Allocation Guidelines.” By considering such 
things as maturity of technology and resources available to deal with the problem, goals were set for specific aspects of 
the technology. In 1981 , in another significant study, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory joined forces with the Solar Energy 
Research Institute to assess the prospects for the various silicon sheet options. Using the SIMRAND model, the uncer- 
tainty surrounding the prospects for various technology elements were incorporated in comparisons between 
technologies. 
As the Project drew toward its close, PA&I made some final assessments of the leading PV technologies under 
development. These studies showed that the FSA Project had achieved many of the goals originally set by the 
National Photovoltaics Program and had made significant progress toward attainment of the more demanding goals of 
the U.S. Department of Energy Five-year Research Plan. More R&D work is necessary, however, for photovoltaics to 
be competitive in today’s energy markets. PA&I hands down the economic and decision-making tools necessary to 
support future efforts to complete the technology development task. It also provides documentation of the Project’s 
history in economic terms. 
, 
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SECTION I 
Introduction 
A. PURPOSE 
The Conference on Photovoltaic Conversion of 
Solar Energy for Terrestrial Applications, held at Cherry 
Hill, New Jersey, in October 1973, initiated an evaluation 
of the use of photovoltaic (PV) conversion devices for 
terrestrial applications. Subsequently, a Federal National 
Photovoltaic Program was formed in 1975 that defined 
an active role for the Government in support of PV 
research and development (R&D). The Conference 
found that PV development for terrestrial applications 
could make a significant contribution to the Nation’s 
energy needs if certain technical questions could be 
resolved and system costs reduced. 
The Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA) Project1 was 
organized at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in 
1975 to implement a research program to achieve the 
flatplate, crystalline-silicon module goals established 
by the National Program. At that time, the FSA Project 
assumed responsibility to support the industrial devel- 
opment of reliable, low-cost ($0.50/Wp), silicon solar 
modules having at least 10 % conversion efficiency 
and a useful life of 20 years. Since then, FSA R&D has 
encompassed all phases of flat-plate module technology, 
from basic feedstock materials of the PV manufacturing 
processes, through verification of module reliability and 
performance in the field. 
Organization of the Project showed it to be unique, 
not only for its broad spectrum of activities as well as 
its system integration activities, but also because of 
the number of industrial organizations, Government 
laboratories, academic institutions, and other entities 
with which JPL would have to interact2 Communica- 
tion between JPL and the ower participating organiza- 
tions, therefore, would be an important factor in the 
Project’s success. FSA was one of the first projects at 
JPL, and certainly the largest, for which economic per- 
formance was the principal measure of success. Techni- 
cal performance was not the ultimate goal, but only a 
contributing factor to the attainment of the economic 
goals. Thus, new analytical methods would be needed 
to translate technical performance into future economic 
performance. The Project Analysis and Integration (PA&I) 
Task was formed as part of the original Project structure 
to address the problem of communication and to provide 
the analyses needed to guide the Project’s technical 
development toward achievement of the National 
Photovoltaic Program’s goals. 
The purpose of this document is to reflect upon the 
activities undertaken by the PA&I task to fulfill the objec- 
tives set for it both at the time of the formation of the 
FSA Project and as the Project evolved. The PA&I con- 
tributions to the Project essentially have been supportive, 
involving the preparation of analytical studies to aid Proj- 
ect management in its planning and decision making, 
and the preparation and documentation of detailed plans 
to integrate Project tasks and ensure their timely comple- 
tion. Activities undertaken by PA&I as the planning and 
analysis wing of the Project will be described, along with 
a perspective on PA&l’s role vis-a-vis other elements of 
the National Photovoltaics Program. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
Section II briefly describes some of the activities 
PA&I initiated within FSA to help establish and main- 
tain an effective, goalaiented technical program. 
Early Program goals and changes in goals and philos- 
ophy are discussed in Section Ill, along with a descrip- 
tion of how the PA&I planning task responded to the 
changes. Section IV not only discusses some of the 
more important models developed at JPL to evaluate 
technologies, but also those project results that might 
have been anticipated if alternative R&D paths were 
pursued by the Project. Section V discusses some of 
the more important PA&I studies and how they affected 
decisionmaking during the tenure of the Project. Section 
VI summarizes the status of crystallinesilicon technology 
today. Section VI1 summarizes some “lessons learned” 
and the legacy left by significant accomplishments of the 
PA&I activity. 
The JPL Project, first called the Low-Cost Silicon Solar Array (LSSA) Project, later became the Low-Cost Solar 
Array (LSA) Project, and finally the FSA Project. 
2Technology development at the PV-array level has been managed by JPL. Balance-of-system (BOS) and test and 
evaluation activities have been managed by the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), and PV-array research activi- 
ties have been managed by the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI). 
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SECTION II 
I 1  Perspective 
At the outset, the National Photovoltaics Program 
intended to promote a private, competitive PV industry. 
This meant the industry being able to produce PV sys- 
tems at a cost (including a return on equity) no greater 
than the price at which they could be sold in a competi- 
tive market. The Program developed price goals derived 
from this consideration. Early in the Program, JPL‘s FSA 
Project became responsible for the support of the devel- 
opment of flatplate modules capable of producing elec- 
trical power at a cost of $0.50/Wp in 1974 dollars. Tech- 
nology goals of the Project were directly adopted from 
the original goals established at the Workshop on Photo- 
voltaic Conversion of Solar Energy for Terrestrial Appli- 
cations held at Cherry Hill, New Jersey, in late 1973 
(Reference l).3 
Almost all technology development was to be done 
by industry with JPL providing coordination and leader- 
ship to permit an effective goalariented technical pro- 
gram. The ensuing years saw many important develop- 
ments in PV technology. New crystal growth methods 
were developed to increase crystal ingot growth-size, 
and a number of innovative ribboncrystal growth 
methods were nurtured. Methods of sawing the crystal 
into thin wafers were investigated, and energy efficient, 
low-labor cost processes were developed for processing 
silicon wafers into solar cells. Automated assembly of 
cells into electrical networks of cells replaced hand 
soldering. Entirely new lowcost materials for encap- 
sulating the electrical networks were developed to pre 
duce modules of much longer service lifetime in the field. 
A systematic test and failure analysis program was 
begun to allow industry to avoid many costly failures in 
the field and to quickly rectify those that did occur. 
Engineering of the entire array as an integrated structure 
helped eliminate redundant structural materials. 
From the beginning of the Project, a rapid flow of 
technical information was generated that required sys- 
tematic assessment. A major role of the PA&I Area 
was to establish and maintain Project standards and 
methodologies for comparison of Project options. Act- 
ing as the Project translator between technical and 
economic performance, PA&I tracked and assessed 
Project progress to derive maximum technical and 
economic benefit while keeping cost and risk to a 
minimum. 
A. PROGRESS ASSESSMENT 
In the early years, two major tools were 
developed for economic assessment of candidate 
technologies: 
(1) Price Allocation Guidelines (PAG) is a “top- 
down” apportioning of the Project goal to 
each major step in the production of modules. 
(2) Solar Array Manufacturing Industry Costing 
Standards (SAMICS) is a “bottom-up” com- 
putation of the required market price of each 
candidate technology to assess its potential 
for meeting the allocation in the PAG and to 
compare it to the potential of other candidate 
technologies. 
Because a wide range of activities was to be pur- 
sued, the module development process was divided 
into basic activities, each of which was responsible for 
meeting a certain fraction of the total cost reduction 
required to meet the Program goal. Technical experts 
were queried by PA&I as to the methods by which costs 
might be reduced in their fields of expertise. Allocations 
among the activities were derived through joint consider- 
ation of technical possibilities thought to be available. 
Allocations were formalized through a review process 
into price allocation guidelines for Project activities. 
In this manner, allocations were determined for 
silicon material, for the creation of silicon sheet, for 
processing sheets into cells, and for encapsulating and 
assembling PV modules. As technical innovations were 
achieved, these allocations were revised. The price- 
allocation process became an integral function of the 
PA&I task as the FSA Project’s technological history 
unfolded. Juxtaposed against this process was the 
problem of determination of the economic worth of 
innovations and how it contributed to attainment of the 
Project goal. 
Given the importance of the projected manufacturing 
costs of various processes involved in the choice of 
which technical path to pursue, it was essential that 
technology assessments be made with consistent meth- 
odological assumptions and approaches. For comparing 
3The goal of $0.50/Wp, established at the Cherry Hill Conference, was in late 1973 or 1974 prices. A subsequent 
goal statement for the Project of $0.50/Wp in 1975 dollars did not account for inflation between late 1973 and 
1975. In this report, economic results are referenced to the 1974 dollars proposed at Cherry Hill. 
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PV module manufacturing processes, PA&I developed 
and applied a methodology that employed standardized 
and appropriate costs for labor, materials, utilities, and 
services, while using validated cost-estimating relation- 
ships. Development of SAMICS methodology began 
early in the history of the Project, and was further 
expanded and refined as time progressed. SAMICS 
became the single most important tool of the FSA Pro- 
ject in guiding research priorities and measuring pro- 
gress toward achievement of price goals. (SAMICS 
and other methodologies developed and applied by 
PA&I are discussed in more detail in Section IV of this 
report.) 
As time progressed, complex choices were required 
among the alternative research paths for technology 
development. To complicate matters further, informa- 
tion available on elements of each research path often 
was relatively uncertain in nature (several outcomes 
were possible). In 1981, SlMulation of Research ANd 
Development Projects (SIMRAND) was developed 
specifically to support decision-making in an uncertain 
environment. SIMRAND can estimate the probability 
that a specific research path will be the best from a 
network of possibilities. Using the opinions of experts, 
SIMRAND directly incorporates the uncertain outlook 
surrounding elements along each research path. The 
use of SIMRAND resulted in an improved degree of 
consistency and objectivity in R&D decision-making. 
As research needs were revealed, the PA&I task 
continued to develop expertise and support for the 
development of models required to perform the new 
assessment functions. With the beginning of applica- 
tion experiments in the field, it became important to 
model PV systems in a specific application and geo- 
graphic location. In evaluating the real value of a PV 
system, all costs and revenues over its operating 
lifetime must be included. These considerations led to 
the development of the Lifetime Cost and Performance 
(LCP) model. LCP is a simulation program capable of 
modeling the lifetime performance of a PV array. The 
product of an LCP simulation is the electrical energy 
output, and the cost and revenue streams from the 
system's operation. With LCP in place, studies could 
be performed, for example, to determine the value of 
improvements to the lifetime power output of a system 
and how much additional expense could be incurred 
during cell and module fabrication to acquire added 
performance. 
During the tenure of the FSA Project, the alloca- 
tions and models described above were applied either 
individually to specific problems, such as narrow tech- 
nical decisions, or as an integrated set when high-level, 
long-range management decisions were required. The 
topdown, pricegoal allocations provided each technical 
area with its own economicltechnical subgoals. The tech- 
nical manager of each area had broad discretion how 
that subgoal would be met. The manager continuously 
could evaluate various options by applying the bottom-up 
manufacturing cost simulation (SAMICS), and compare 
the result to that of the topdown pricegoal allocation. 
Manufacturing costpoint estimates generated by 
SAMICS were combined via SIMRAND, with the uncer- 
tainties associated with those estimates, to form proba- 
bility distributions of technical performance and/or cost. 
These distributions were used either individually to 
assess the probability of meeting a sub-goal, or were 
aggregated into probabilities of meeting higher level 
goals. In this way, the results of a SAMICS analysis of 
various technical options were assessed on the basis 
of the probability of meeting the topdown goals of the 
Project. Progress made toward development of a cost 
competitive technology for terrestrial applications was 
evaluated by integrating the results of the SAMICS 
calculations with the results of the solar array oper- 
ating environment using LCP. Lifetime performance 
calculations were made which recognized changing 
price levels and solar cell output degradation over 
time. Using these models, PA&I was able effectively to 
recommend to Project management the technical 
paths likely to achieve the long-term goal of a com- 
petitive PV energy technology. 
B. IMPACT OF INFLATION 
Efforts to measure progress in crystalline-silicon 
technology during the tenure of the FSA Project have 
been made difficult by changes in the level of prices 
for goods and services in the U.S. economy. Through 
the years, inflation has tended to distort and obscure 
actual progress made. The goals, therefore, have been 
restated, and technology improvements have been mea- 
sured in 1985 US. dollars using the Gross National 
Product (GNP) Implicit Price Deflator. This statistic is 
published quarterly by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
US.  Department of Commerce. 
Table 1 shows the upward trend in the general level 
of prices of goods and services since 1974. The total 
Table 1. GNP Implicit Price Deflator 
Average Annual 
Year Inflation Rate, % Cumulative 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
9.7 
9.5 
5.2 
5.8 
7.4 
1 .ooo 
1.097 
1.201 
1.264 
1.337 
979 8.7 1.436 
980 9.0 1.561 
981 9.4 1.706 
982 6.0 1.866 
983 4.2 1.978 
984 ' 3.6 2.049 
1985 3.7 2.1 25 
Source: US. Department of Commerce, Survey of 
Current Business, May 1986. 
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impact Is summarized in the cumulative GNP Implicit 
Price Deflator, which more than doubled since the begin- 
ning of the FSA Project. The changing level of prices 
makes it difficult to detect the more subtle changes 
that have taken place in program goals. The original 
price goal envisioned for the technology was $0.5O/Wp 
in 1974 dollars. Using the Implicit Price Deflator, the 
equivalent value for the goal in 1985 dollars is $l.O7/Wp. 
C. IMPACT OF SHIFTING PROGRAM GOALS 
In May 1983, the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) Photovoltaic Energy Technology Division issued 
a National Photovoltaics Program Five-Year Research 
Plan, 1984-1 988 (Reference 2) that significantly altered 
the original goals of the FSA Project. The goal since 
the Cherry Hill Conference in late 1973 had been 
$0.50/Wp ($1.07/Wp in 1985 dollars). Thus, a PV 
system would have to produce electricity at a cost of 
$0.263/kWh in 1985 dollars, using the energy cost 
methodology in the DOE Five-Year Research Plan.4 
With the Five-Year Plan, National Program goals 
changed to reflect revisions in the outlook for conven- 
tional energy resources and progress made in under- 
standing the potential of PV technology. Current Pro- 
gram goals call for 15 % module efficiency and a 
30-year module service life. Expressed in 1985 dollars, 
the price goals correspond to an energy cost of 
$0.1 7/kWh, making them much more demanding than 
the original values. It was the task of PA&I to interpret 
these revisions in the goal structure and to assess 
their effects on the FSA Project’s technical goals. 
In general, the impact of the revision of goals has 
been to shift the Program’s research effort toward thin- 
film solar cell technologies. Although singlecrystal silicon 
modules dominated commercial production during 
much of the Project’s tenure, thin-film technology 
seems to offer the potential for lower costs in the long 
run.5 Recent gains in solar cell efficiencies, however, 
have made singlecrystal silicon a strong competitor 
for the future technology that ultimately will achieve 
market competitiveness. 
4This result was derived using a module efficiency of 10% and a 20-year module service life, as originally 
5The thin-film technology effort has been successful in adopting many of the cell-processing and encapsulation 
specified at Cherry Hill. 
technologies developed for singlecrystal silicon solar cells. 
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SECTION I l l  
Planning Activities: 1975 to 1985 
As a consequence of its role in defining Project 
goals and tracking progress, PA&I intimately was 
involved, usually as the lead organization, in the formula- 
tion of long-range Project plans and was a major contrib- 
utor to most National Photovoltaics Program plans. The 
planning procedure typically was an iterative process 
between PAM and other involved parties. Because PA& 
included technically cognizant personnel aware of the 
status of the various involved technologies, first drafts of 
Project long-range plans were written by PA&I, based on 
requirements defined by Project management. The first 
draft tentatively would define cost goals for each major 
technical activity of the Project. Preliminary technical 
goals, schedules, and milestones were derived based on 
the cost goal, the status of the technology, and an 
assessment of the difficulty of work required to reach the 
goal. The various models and simulations described later 
in this document were extensively applied in this pro- 
cess. The draft plan then was reviewed by Project tech- 
nical managers. Modifications in successive drafts were 
negotiated between P A M  the technical managers, and 
the Project Office until the final plan was completed. 
Resource distributions based on the plan then were 
negotiated between the Project Manager and the techni- 
cal area managers, with PA&I playing a supporting, but 
minor, role. 
A. NATIONAL PHOTOVOLTAICS PROGRAM 
PLANNING: THE EARLY YEARS 
Between 1975 and 1980, PA&I played a major 
part in formulation of National Photovoltaics Program 
plans. Prior to 1977, this Program was guided by the 
Proceedings of the Workshop on Photovoltaic Conver- 
sion of Solar Energy for Terrestrial Applications held at 
Cherry Hill, New Jersey, and a succession of Energy 
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) docu- 
ments formalizing the Workshop results (References 1, 
and 3 through 7). The Workshop was funded by the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) and organized by 
JPL. At this workshop, goals for 1985 of $0.50/Wp 
(1 974 dollars), 10 % conversion efficiency, 500 MW/year 
production, and 20-year lifetime were established for 
singlecrystal silicon solar cell technology. Basic sched- 
ules were formed for the selection of processes for 
development and scale-up, and for largescale plant 
construction. The prospects for CdSICu2S and other 
thin-film materials were discussed, and schedules 
were set that were less definitive than for silicon. Solar 
thermal and satellite systems also were discussed. It 
was the silicon plans and schedules from Cherry Hill, 
however, that attained amazing longevity by becoming 
the foundation of the JPL FSA Project. During the period 
1973 to 1977, the Cherry Hill report was the de facto 
Photovoltaics Program Plan, and the document that 
inspired the organization of the FSA Project. 
By the summer of 1976, the Photovoltaics Pro- 
gram had grown considerably. It had been transferred 
from NSF to ERDA and was in need of a program plan 
that more accurately reflected what actually was hap- 
pening. At the behest of ERDA, a Program Planning 
Group (PPG) was formed, consisting of representatives 
from JPL, SNL, Massachussetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) Energy Lab, MIT Lincoln Lab, NASA Lewis 
Research Center, DOD, and the Aerospace Corp. During 
a period of a year, the PPG formulated a detailed plan 
that updated the Cherry Hill technology plans, moved the 
technology development goals to 1986, expanded them 
to explicitly include concentrators, described a detailed 
test and demonstration plan, and broadened the scope to 
include commercialization and industrialization goals. 
PA&I personnel were key participants and lead authors 
in the formulation of these plans, especially the Tech- 
nology Development and Test and Demonstration Plans. 
The PPG Plan never was printed in final form. It was 
superseded by the ERDA Solar Division Director’s Plan. 
The foundation of the Director’s Plan (Reference 8) 
was “market pull” involving large Government purchases 
of PV hardware through Program Research and Develop- 
ment Announcements (PRDAs) with early, large-scale 
utility experiments. The Director presented his plan to 
a congressional committee in August 1977. The plan 
was not well received because its thrust virtually ignored 
residential applications that had been identified in a Con- 
gressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study 
as being especially attractive to photovoltaics. The Plan 
then was revised and reissued February 3, 1978, con- 
taining expanded residential applications, but retaining 
the market-pull program strategy. It was reissued again in 
March 1978 with minor changes. 
There followed a period of progressively more 
organized concern in the PV community that questioned 
the viability of market pull as a device to attain Program 
goals. This culminated in a detailed examination of mar- 
ket pull in the SERl Venture Analysis issued in June 1978 
(Reference 9). Its conclusions cast serious doubt on the 
fundamental assumptions of the Director’s Plan. In addi- 
tion, legislation by Congress, the “Solar Photovoltaics 
Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act 
of 1978,” Public Law 95-590, called for a major, well- 
financed, 1 C-year program of PV R&D activities. 
In 1977, ERDA was replaced by DOE. In 1978, DOE 
initiated the formation of a Photovoltaics Lead Center 
and identified the need for a new Multiyear Program 
Plan (MYPP). JPL, in its role of as yet unofficial Photo- 
voltaics Lead Center, proposed to DOE that JPL should 
coordinate and integrate the MYPP. The content of the 
MYPP first draft issued in June 1979, and reissued in 
September 1980, differed from its predecessors in 
placing a heavy emphasis on “technology push” 
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involving R&D of advanced materials. The draft also 
incorporated “fixed price buys” of hardware to supply 
the applications experiments. Program goals were 
redefined, for the first time since Cherry Hill, to be 
system-price goals rather than component price goals. 
Specific production quantity goals were deleted, through 
recognition of the fact that the National Photovoltaics 
Program had no direct control of markets. 
B. FSA PROJECT PLANS 
In all the Program plans, the most important inter- 
mediate milestone for FSA technology development 
was the attainment by the end of fiscal year (FY) 1982 
of “Technical Readiness for $0.70/Wp (1 980 dollars) 
Technology.” Technical readiness for a $0.7O/Wp PV 
technology implies that all processes required have 
been verified with prototype equipment and that the 
processes and equipment are ready for application to 
a scaled-up production level, sufficient in size to cap- 
ture most economies of scale. In September 1979, 
PA&I completed a major detailed plan describing the 
path to technical readiness. This culminated in late 
1982 with monitored physical demonstrations of the 
processes and equipment required to fabricate 
$0.70/Wp (1 980 dollars) PV modules. 
A milestone such as “Technical Readiness” has 
meaning only in the context of a well-defined goal. 
Methods are required to gauge the relevance of the 
technology embodied in prototype processes to the 
stated goal, and to tell when the goal has been reached. 
Both of these conditions were present in the manage- 
ment of the JPL Photovoltaics Project and are discussed 
in more detail later in this document. 
The “Technical Readiness 1982 Plan” (Refer- 
ence 10) called for design and fabrication of experi- 
mental equipment for bulk polysilicon production, crys- 
tal growth, and cell and module fabrication. Some equip- 
ment was to be sub-scale, such as the polysilicon plant, 
but most were to be full-scale prototypes of production 
equipment. Provisions were made to experimentally 
ensure that the product of each process would be com- 
patible with all following processes. This was considered 
to be especially important because PV manufacturers are 
very cautious about interrupting production to install new 
processes or equipment if there is any question about 
compatibility with adjacent processes in the fabrication 
sequence. 
In addition to manufacturing-technology develop- 
ment, the Technical Readiness Plan called for extensive 
module design and testing activities to ensure that the 
fabrication technology produced fault-tolerant, long-lived 
modules for service in the field. It was deemed important 
for photovoltaics to avoid the damage to user and public 
perception that results from the kinds of costly, highly 
visible failures that had befallen some other renewable 
energy technologies because of insufficient quality con- 
trol and testing prior to fielding the product. 
From 1979 to mid-1981, the Technical Readiness 
Plan guided the JPL Photovoltaics Project. This was the 
period of maximum Project activity. More than 100 con- 
tracts were in force for all phases of flat-plate PV tech- 
nology. The largest of the largescale purchases of mod- 
ules from manufacturers for testing and demonstration 
occurred during this time, and fabrication of prototype 
equipment for integrated prototype production lines was 
well underway. 
In 1979, PA&I began to examine the question of 
what Project activities would be appropriate in the 
FY 83-to-FY 86 timeframe given that the objectives 
and goals of the Technical Readiness 1982 Plan were 
fulfilled. A rather lengthy planning and review process 
followed with the final plan undergoing formal JPL 
in-house review in the spring of 1981 . 
The FY-83-to-FY-86 Plan called for an active JPL 
role in the transfer and diffusion to private industry of 
the technology developed under the Technical Readi- 
ness 1982 Plan. Laboratories and prototype equipment 
were to be used for hands-on, industry-user familiariza- 
tion; facilities were to be available for problem solving 
and troubleshooting to aid manufacturers adopting the 
technology developed in the DOUJPL Project. The Plan 
also called for an active program in developing module 
standards for performance, reliability, and safety that 
would help prevent costly failures in the hands of PV 
users. The Project was to help in the establishment of 
independent testing laboratories for use by industry to 
certify their products. 
In mid-1981, a series of events occurred that obvi- 
ated many key features of both the Technical Readiness 
Plan and the FY 83-FY 86 Plan. Late in the fiscal year, 
budget recisions brought an abrupt halt to several devel- 
opment efforts and severely curtailed others. The DOE 
FY 82 budget specifically mandated the cancellation of 
the integrated prototype production lines known as Mod- 
ule Experimental Process Systems Development Units 
(MEPSDUs). Thus, it no longer was possible to demon- 
strate, end-toend, the fabrication of PV modules and 
thereby ensure the industry that no undesirable effects 
occurred among the newly developed processes. 
Fragmentation of the cell and module process and 
equipment development into small, widely scattered 
work packages resulted in heavier reliance on the 
analytical modeling performed in PA&I to assess the 
status of the technology. Because the modeling then 
had to be done using incomplete data, integration of 
the production line had to be done “on paper.” In 
retrospect, the resulting analyses have held up well. At 
the time, however, the analyses seemed to lack credi- 
bility in the industry because there was little tangible 
evidence that the assumptions of the analyses could 
be realized in an actual integrated production line. 
C. THE FIVE-YEAR RESEARCH PLAN: A NEW 
DIRECTION 
In May 1983, the DOE Photovoltaics Energy Tech- 
nology Division issued the National Photovoltaics Pro- 
gram FiveYear Research Plan, 1984-1988. It has guided 
8 . .  
the Project since then. Although PA&I had no role in 
development of that plan, subsequent analyses by PA&I 
led to modifications of certain key assumptions on which 
the goals in the Five-Year Plan are based. This left the 
Five-Year Plan goals unchanged, but provided more 
flexibility in how the goals could be attained. 
The Five-Year Plan significantly altered the goals 
of the JPL Project for module price and efficiencies. 
The goal since the Cherry Hill Conference had been 
$0.50/Wp (1 974 dollars), equivalent to $l.O7/Wp in 
1985 dollars. When this price is used in the Five-Year 
Plan energycost methodology, the result is $0.263/kWh. 
The Five-Year Plan, however, called for an energy cost 
of $0.1 7/kWh in 1985 dollars. To meet this goal, much 
more stringent requirements had to be placed on module 
costs and efficiencies. Based on PA&I studies, two prin- 
cipal avenues existed for meeting these goals. One was 
research to improve sunlight-to-electricity conversion 
efficiency, and the other was to reduce the cost of the 
silicon wafer. Barring a dramatic breakthrough in ingot 
growth and sawing, silicon ribbon became the only 
crystalline-silicon technology capable of achieving the 
new DOE goals. 
The Project was reoriented in these directions with 
an emphasis on basic cell characteristic improvements, 
highefficiency module design, and enhancement of the 
dendritic web ribbon growth effort. A Project Implemen- 
tation Plan (Reference 11) was drafted as an internal 
guide to implement the provisions of the Five-Year Plan. 
In February 1985, however, JPL was directed to termi- 
nate the Project at the end of FY 86. 
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SECTION IV 
Analytical Model Development 
One of the primary responsibilities of the PA&I 
team during the life of the FSA Project has been the 
development of models to support the decision-making 
and planning activities of Project management. From 
the beginning of the Project, a rapid flow of technical 
information was generated dealing with the status of 
alternative solar cell technologies. There was an immed- 
iate need for ways to convert this technical information 
into terms that would allow comparisons between tech- 
nologies and assessments of progress being made 
toward the goals of the National Program. 
developed by PA&I for technology assessment work 
were: 
Three of the most important models that were 
(1 ) Solar Array Manufacturing Industry Costing 
Standards (SAM ICs). 
(2) SlMulation of Research ANd Development 
Projects (SIMRAND). 
(3) Lifetime Cost and Performance Model (LCP). 
Briefly, SAMICS is a methodology for the preparation 
of production cost estimates for PV modules. SIMRAND 
is a Monte Carlo simulation program that can analyze 
complex R&D decisions involving uncertain information. 
LCP is a simulation model for estimating the output, 
costs, and revenues of a PV system over its lifetime. 
These models have been implemented on the IBM-XT 
and are being made available to the public through 
NASA’s Computer Software and Management Infor- 
mation Center (COSMIC) located in Athens, Georgia. 
Models also have been developed by PA&I for use in 
the design of solar cells and solar cell arrays. 
All of these models, described in this section, 
have been successfully applied by PA&I in its support- 
ing role to Project management. Examples of specific 
studies for which the models were used are presented 
in the next section. (See Section IX, Selected Bibli- 
ography, for documents describing these models.) 
A. SAMICS 
SAMICS was developed as a part of a fair, consis- 
tent, and reliable way to compare the various manufac- 
turing processes developed by FSA Project subcon- 
tractors. The approach was that of an engineering-cost 
model that builds a company around detailed manufac- 
turing process descriptions. Rule-of-thumb methods, 
using customary productioncoefficients, were deter- 
mined to be inappropriate because of the new nature 
6See Appendix A, Aster, R.W., et al. 
of the processes involved. Because of the relatively 
unique nature of PV technology, reasonable cost 
estimates could not be expected from methods based 
on comparisons with existing manufacturing processes 
used in the production of other products. 
Considerable emphasis was placed on standardiza- 
tion of the SAMICS methodology to ensure comparability 
of results between PV technologies and different time 
periods. The SAMICS model was constructed around a 
manufacturing facility designed specifically for the pro- 
duction of PV modules. The description of the PV facility 
included a description of indirect labor requirements 
including administrative and managerial personnel. This 
provided a standardized set of indirect requirements for 
plant and facilities that also is included in the standard- 
ized indirect requirements and cost descriptions of the 
SAMICS methodology. A standard set of financial param- 
eters including rate of return on equity, interest rates, 
taxes, and insurance is built into the SAMICS model. 
As part of the program, a Cost Account Catalog, con- 
taining price information on a wide range of inputs 
used in PV module production, has been published.6 
The catalog has been updated periodically to reflect 
relative changes in the prices of inputs and changes in 
the expected rate of inflation. Figure 1 gives an over- 
view of the SAMICS methodology. 
Users of the Standard Assembly Line Manufactur- 
ing Industry Simulation (SAMIS) program, the computer 
implementation of the SAMICS methodology, can 
change any of the indirect input or financial param- 
eters. Leaving these parameters at their initial settings, 
however, makes possible direct comparisons of manu- 
facturing process technologies. SAMIS has been used 
by the FSA Project in comparing several technology 
options. It also has been used to track technical pro- 
gress over extended periods of time. 
SAMIS simulates the operation of a company, 
described by the user, to develop detailed estimates of 
input utilization, capital requirements, and financial flows 
of an operating business. Specifically, a hypothetical fac- 
tory is “built,” based on manufacturing process descrip- 
tions developed by the user. The manufacturing process 
description requires the user to specify process inputs. 
To simulate the facility’s operation, an appropriate work- 
force, determined by SAMIS, consists of production 
workers, administrators, and managers. The cost of 
labor, along with materials, building space, and utilities 
are taken from a supporting cost-account catalog. A 
detailed financial model is applied to determine the costs 
of operation, including depreciation, taxes, insurance, 
and amortization of one-time startup costs. 
The SAMIS computer program has extensive 
report-generating capabilities. Reports include indi- 
vidual process descriptions that indicate use of indi- 
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The SAMIS computer program implements this methodology by simulation: 
n 
ENDOGENOUS DEMANOS 
FROM OTHER COMPANIES 
Q 
0 
0 
Figure 1. SAMICS Methodology Overview 
vidual inputs and their cost, company-wide summaries 
of inputs, and a complete set of financial reports 
covering the operation of the company. 
The recently developed personal-computer ver- 
sion of the SAMIS program has two additional modes 
of operation: Solar Array Manufacturing Price Estima- 
tion Guidelines (SAMPEG) and Improved Price Estima- 
tion Guidelines (IPEG). SAMPEG is expected to be 
used in most cases because it provides much quicker 
estimates of process costs (usually less than 5 min) 
than SAMIS with only a small sacrifice in accuracy. 
/ 
SAMPEG was developed using a combination of 
SAMIS and the IPEG model. The latter is a much simpler 
linear approximation for SAMIS. SAMPEG employs the 
datamanager and manufacturing-process sequencing 
algorithms from SAMIS with factory construction, staffing 
approximations, and financial submodels of IPEG. These 
approximations and shorter run times dictate a limited 
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reporting format. A table is produced that lists the value- 
added price of each process and the contribution of 
labor, materials, building space, equipment, and utilities 
to process cost. 
IPEG, like SAMPEG, provides quick estimates of 
the results of a more detailed SAMIS simulation. IPEG 
calculates process cost from five overhead factors. The 
overhead factors usually are generated by a prior SAMIS 
simulation. These overhead factors convert direct inputs 
of equipment, labor, materials, utilities, and floor space 
into an estimate of product cost. IPEG users quickly and 
efficiently can explore effects of changes in each of 
these direct input categories. Essentially, the IPEG model 
has been constructed so that sensitivity studies can be 
made of the effect on costs if any one of a number of 
financial assumptions in the SAMIS model is changed. 
Ranges for a parameter can be specified, and the results 
of changing the parameter can be displayed in tabular 
form and/or plotted on the monitor. 
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B. SIMRAND that various growth rates will be achieved as shown in 
Figure 3. Similar distributions are developed to reflect the 
outcome of R&D work on other elements of the network. Program management for PV R&D involves complex 
choices among alternative research paths for technology 
development. To complicate matters further, the informa- 
tion available on elements of each research path is often 
relatively uncertain in nature. Thus, several outcomes 
are possible. SIMRAND was developed specifically to 
support decision-making in this uncertain environment. 
Under a given set of constraints, SIMRAND can estimate 
the probability that a specific research path will be the 
best from a network of possible paths. Using the opinions 
of experts, SIMRAND directly incorporates the uncer- 
tain outlook surrounding elements along each research 
path. Wherever possible, objective data are used as a 
guide in bounding the parameters in question. The result 
is an improved degree of consistency and objectivity in 
R&D decision-making. 
SIMRAND is a generalized method for analysis of 
the information available for making decisions in a 
R&D environment. The first step in the process is to 
delineate the network of paths that are consistent with 
objectives of the R&D effort. For example, along the 
path to make lowcost silicon solar cells, several dif- 
ferent methods have been proposed for growing crys- 
talline silicon feedstock. Each of these techniques 
generates a new path that could be followed by a 
research program. An example of a test network for 
solar cell module production is shown in Figure 2. 
STEP 1 , STEP2 , STEP 3 STEP4 , STEP 5 ' SILICON CRYSTALLIZATION SAWING ' CELL ' MODULE 
PUR1 F l  CAT1 ON 
Figure 2. Task Network for Solar-Cell Module 
Production 
The next step is to define the expected outcome 
of R&D work to improve each element in the network. 
To continue with our earlier example, experts would be 
asked to indicate what growth rates are likely to be 
achieved through additional R&D work on silicon ingot 
growth by the Czochralski (Cz) process. To capture 
the uncertainty in the outlook, experts would be asked 
to indicate a range of possible growth rates and how 
confident they were that each rate (or a better value) 
would be achieved. For example, the experts might 
believe there was a 50% chance of achieving a growth 
rate of 1.7 kgk or better, and a 90% chance of achiev- 
ing a growth rate of 1.4 kgh or better. The result is a 
cumulative distribution that summarizes the probability 
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Figure 3. Example of a Cumulative Probability 
Distribution for Silicon Ingot Growth 
Rates 
One other piece of information used by SIMRAND is 
a quantitative representation of how decision makers feel 
about the various possible outcomes of the research 
effort. For example, a decision maker may place a much 
greater value on achieving a goal of $1 .OO/Wp, in com- 
parison to $1.20/Wp, because of the need to compete 
with alternative technologies for generating electricity. 
These preferences can be incorporated in a utility func- 
tion and included in the SIMRAND evaluation process. 
A Monte Carlo simulation method is used by 
SIMRAND to integrate all the information into a single 
result. Monte Carlo simulation corresponds to the pro- 
cess of throwing a pair of dice many times to estimate 
the probability that each outcome, 2 through 12, will 
occur. SIMRAND randomly selects a value for each 
element in the network. For this single trial, SIMRAND 
finds the optimal path through the network from the 
cumulative distributions generated by the cognizant 
experts. The outcome is tabulated just as one would 
record the result of rolling a pair of dice when esti- 
mating the probability of various outcomes. SIMRAND 
continues with these trials until sufficient information 
has been generated to accurately describe the range 
of possible outcomes. 
Besides evaluation of the outcome of a specific 
R&D effort as described by a network, SIMRAND can be 
used to measure consequences of adding or eliminating 
elements from the network. The SIMRAND simulation 
simply is repeated with a new element or an element 
removed to see how results are affected. Entirely differ- 
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ent research programs also can be compared with 
SIMRAND. Unlike similiar methods that focus on the 
gram’s goals, although the probability of success was 
less than perhaps a lower-payoff option. 
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most likely outcome of elements in a research program, 
SIMRAND shows the range of possible outcomes of 
carrying out each research program. 
SIMRAND was used successfully to compare 
various technical options supported by the National 
Photovoltaics Research Program. The uncertainty in the 
minds of experts about the outcome of various research 
efforts were mirrored in the results as they reflected a 
wide range of possible outcomes. At times, the results 
vindicated support for what was viewed as less attractive 
research paths by showing that if these paths were suc- 
cessful, the payoff would be high for reaching the PrG- 
LOAD 
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c .  LCP 
PARAMETERS I 
I 
The need to model PV systems in a specific appli- 
cation and under conditions of a specific geographic 
location led to the development of the LCP. LCP is a 
simulation program capable of modeling the lifetime 
performance of a PV array. The product of the LCP 
simulation is the electricity output, and cost and reve- 
nue streams from the systems operation. Input require- 
ments of the LCP model and the output of a LCP 
simulation are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. LCP’s Role in the Analysis of the 
Performance of a Photovoltaic System 
LCP’s calculation of systemenergy output is based 
on the system’s electrical design, hourly weather condi- 
tions, and long-term variations in power output. Simulat- 
ing the system’s performance on an hourly basis makes 
it possible to calculate revenues under a timeafday rate 
schedule or a block rate schedule. Figure 5 shows an 
example of how LCP simulates the load demand and 
energy output of a PV system, including the degradation 
of system output over time. 
Provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act (PURPA) of 1978, Public Law 95-61 7, require utilities 
to purchase electricity from qualifying, distributed, small- 
power producers at their net avoided costs. Owners of 
qualifying systems have the option to interconnect with 
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Figure 5. LCP Load and System Output 
Simulation Example 
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the utility in either of two ways: a parallel or a simultan- 
eous mode. In the parallel mode, excess power gener- 
ated is sold back to the utility at avoided costs. In the 
simultaneous mode, all electricity produced by the PV 
system is sold to the utility at the sell-back rate, while 
simultaneously purchasing all energy requirements from 
the utility at the normal rate for the customer class. Either 
situation can be simulated with the LCP model. 
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In combination with a financial model, LCP can be 
used to explore several important issues in the areas 
of system design and application. One example is the 
use of LCP in the selection of the best tracking option 
for a specific PV system application. Available insola- 
tion values and operating temperatures are fed to LCP 
for conversion to lifetime output, cost, and revenue 
streams. The supporting financial model then is able to 
calculate the economic value of the alternative systems. 
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A number of application issues can be handled 
effectively with the combination of LCP and the finan- 
cial model. One issue is the operation and maintenance 
(O&M) schedule selected for a PV system application. 
Both alternative O&M policies can be evaluated in terms 
of their cost, incremental energy output, and dollar value. 
For example, evaluation of a cleaning program involves 
the input of the power gain resulting from each sched- 
uled cleaning (based on the cleaning procedure, module 
cover material, and type of detergent), the number of 
cleanings for each month of the year, and the sitespecific 
environmental conditions (i.e., the dirt-accumulation rates 
and the effects of precipitation). LCP has been used to 
show that the correct selection of an O&M schedule 
can lead to significant cost savings during a PV 
system's lifetime. 
D. PVARRAY 
PA&I developed the PVARRAY model to simulate 
array performance with the passage of time. The eco- 
nomic evaluation of solar cell technologies requires a 
technical assessment of their lifetime performance. 
PVARRAY can model the effect of random solar cell 
failure on system performance and adjust for various 
strategies of failed module replacement. 
during its lifetime. The PVARRAY model includes the 
ability to compare performance of different module 
designs, the capacity to consider alternative series- 
parallel wiring schemes, and the ability to evaluate 
alternative replacement strategies for different cell- 
failure rates and bypassdiode placements. 
PVARRAY simulates the power output of a PV array 
The combination of PVARRAY, SAMICS, and LCP 
has been used by PA&I to estimate the net present value 
of energy from a PV system during its useful lifetime. 
Manufacturing costs for the module-production sequence 
have been estimated using SAMICS, and the lifecycle 
cost and performance have been simulated using LCP in 
combination with PVARRAY. The three programs have 
allowed PA&I to calculate the cost of different module 
designs and to determine the timedependent economic 
impact of design changes by simulating array perform- 
ance and lifecycle cost (Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Example of Cell Degradation and Lifetime Performance for Three Different Module Designs 
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E. CELLOPT 
The PA&I team periodically was called upon to 
apply operations research methods directly to techni- 
cal problems. An example of this type of activity was 
the effort to optimize the metallization grid pattern on a 
PV cell. The problem had many interdependent attri- 
butes to consider: resistance losses in the metal grid 
and silicon, shadowing losses, metallization reliability 
and service life, and cost. An interactive computer 
program, Cell Optimization Model (CELLOPT), was 
developed to assist engineers in the design of current- 
collecting, metalgrid patterns for solar cells. Given a 
cell shape, silicon resistivity, metallization material, 
and metal application method, the methodology con- 
structs a grid pattern to keep to a minimum the cell 
power loss that arises from the currentcollecting 
mechanisms. The program does not directly incor- 
porate cost considerations. The CELLOPT output, 
however, can be used by SAMICS to calculate manu- 
facturing cost sensitivities. These, in turn, can be used 
in the LCP model to ascertain life-cycle cost effective- 
ness of a specific metallization pattern. 
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SECTION V 
Major Studies 
The charter of PA&I was to support the decision- 
making process of Project management. This was to 
be done with quantitative studies of the status and 
future prospects of a wide range of technical develop- 
ment options. The studies typically involved interac- 
tions with both technical areas of the Project and with 
industry to acquire the technical parameters necessary 
to estimate the economic characteristics of a piece of 
equipment, a process or sequence of processes, or a 
product. Technical information then was translated into 
economic information by exercising one or more of the 
models described in Section IV. Results were compiled 
and distributed to interested parties to aid the decision 
process. 
The totality of studies performed by PA&I since 
1975 is much too large for detailed listing since the 
analysis function has been essentially a continuous 
process. Many studies were “quick-look” estimates 
performed for DOE management and/or in response to 
some event occurring outside the JPL PV Project. A 
significant number of studies involved sensitive infor- 
mation held proprietary by industry. Although the pro- 
prietary information at times was very detailed and 
extensive, no proprietary concern ever was violated 
by PA&I. 
In this section, the only studies mentioned are those 
that affected the course of the FSA Project, the DOE 
Program, or were milestone assessments. Quantitative 
results are limited to landmark studies. Generally, the 
studies are presented in chronological order and their 
effect on the direction of PV development is described. 
Note that quantitative results of studies reported are 
stated in different base-year dollars. This reflects the 
adjustment of Program goals and milestone statements 
to the changing value of the dollar over time. 
A. GUIDELINES FOR PRICE ALLOCATION 
The JPL PV Project was divided into several techni- 
cal tasks involving the manufacture of PV modules: sili- 
con feedstock, silicon wafer or sheet, cell and module 
fabrication, and encapsulation materials. The combined 
objective for these efforts was the Project goal to develop 
technology able to produce PV modules with a selling 
price of $0.50/Wp (1 974 dollars), free on board (FOB) 
factory dock. To assist in management of the effort, the 
Project goal was subdivided or allocated among the 
various technical tasks. This was done on an “equal 
pain” basis, taking into account the difficulty of the prob- 
lem, the maturity of the technology, and the industrial 
resources available to attack the problems at hand. The 
first PAGs were presented in the Second Project Integra- 
tion Meeting (PIM) of the LSSA Project in April 1976. 
From that time, the PAG has been updated whenever it 
became apparent that any of the allocation criteria had 
changed. An example of a Guideline is shown in Table 2 
from the 1978 PAG (Reference 12). 
Table 2. Example of 1978 Ingot Technology Price Allocation Guidelines (Reference 12) * 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 
Encapsulated Cell Efficiency (56) 
Module Efficiencv (%)  
11.5 13 14 15 16.9 
8.6 10.1 11.2 12.8 14.4 
Guidelines Goals 
Silicon $Ikg 
$IWp 
65 60 40 17 10 
I .42 1.10 0.47 0.1 9 0.095 
Sheet $/mzsheet 21 4 129 90 54 18 
(value added) $IWp 2.33 1.24 0.72 0.38 0.112 
Cells $/m2celt 200 120 52 30 22 
(value added) $IWD 1.74 0.92 0.37 .20 0.1 30 
Encapsulation $/m2 module 30 25 15 10 8 
materials $IWp 0.35 0.25 0.1 3 0.08 0.055 
Module $/m2module 100 50 34 20 15.5 
(value added) $/Wp 1.16 0.49 0.31 0.1 5 0.1 08 
Totals $/m2 module 602 404 224 128 72 
$IWD 7.00 4.00 2.00 1 .oo 0.50 
*Although the stated goal at that time called for modules of at least 10% efficiency, the efficiency was traded off 
against module cost. It was realized at that time that module efficiencies considerably greater than 10% were 
highly probable. 
17 
The PAGs were the “topdown” statement of what 
would be necessary for each technical task to accomplish 
to reach the Project goal. The SAMICS methodology, 
described in Section IV, then was applied to examine 
the capability of various technical options to meet the 
task allocation goals and the overall Project price goal. 
During the years of the JPL Project, only four major 
issuances of the PAGs were made (1 976, 1978, 1980, 
and 1984). The 1984 update was a major modification 
of the PAG because of the much more stringent require- 
ments on manufacturing cost and module efficiency that 
were called for in the DOE Five-Year Research Plan of 
May 1983. Comparison of the ‘topdown” allocation with 
the detailed “bottomup” SAMICS analysis provided an 
extremely powerful procedure for sorting out the most 
promising cost-effective technical options. 
B. CANDIDATE FACTORIES FOR $0.50/Wp 
TECHNOLOGY (1 977) 
The first detailed, bottom-up SAMICS analysis of 
the cost of manufacturing PV modules occurred in 1977 
with the publication of “Economic Analysis of a Candi- 
date 50Np Flat-Plate Photovoltaic Manufacturing Tech- 
nology” (Reference 13). The analysis assumed a large 
plant (250 MW/year) based on edge-defined, film-fed 
growth (EFG) silicon ribbon. For the first time, the study 
showed that ribbon technologies, if technically success- 
ful, had the economic capability to meet or exceed the 
Project price goal. A corollary study in 1978 examined a 
$ 2 N p  candidate factory based on Cz silicon solar cells. 
For the first time, these studies delineated in detail 
the requirements both for a long-range, large-scale PV 
factory and a near-term, moderate-scale factory. Quanti- 
tative sensitivities of final product price to various 
technical and economic factors were visible in an 
internally self-consistent format. The results of these 
studies formed the economic foundation that guided 
the long-term technical thrusts in silicon ribbon-based 
technology, and the near-term thrust in ingot-based 
technology. 
C. NEAR-TERM COST-REDUCTION “TSONGAS” 
PROCUREMENT (1978 TO 1981) 
In 1978, a congressional initiative was imple- 
mented for the “Near-Term Cost Reduction in Photo- 
voltaics,” known more commonly as the “Tsongas” 
procurement after the Congressman who initiated the 
enabling legislation. Some 55 proposals, ranging over 
the entire spectrum of PV technologies, were received 
for rapid evaluation. Because the purpose of the procure 
ment was to solicit ideas for technological developments 
having an immediate (within 2 to 4 years) impact on the 
price of PV modules, a way was needed to quickly eval- 
uate the numerous proposals. Proposals were evaluated 
on the basis of potential payoff, risk of failure, cost to the 
PV Program, cost of technology transfer, and timeliness 
of payoff if the proposed development were to prove 
successful. PA&I worked with FSA Project management, 
and JPL Procurement and Legal Counsel to develop an 
internally selfconsistent methodology for ranking the pro- 
posals. The proposal evaluation process proved to be 
very effective. In several instances, when proposals that 
seemed very attractive technologically were examined 
using the methodology, it became apparent that some of 
the suggested innovations actually would have increased 
the cost of PV modules. From the 55 proposals sub- 
mitted, 14 were selected for award. 
At the conclusion of the “Near-Term Cost-Reduction’’ 
contracts in 1981, PA&I participated in an assessment 
of the results of the development effort and compared 
those results to the benefits predicted 3 years earlier 
during the proposal evaluation process. Of the 14 con- 
tracts, five failed technically and resulted in no cost 
reduction; four resulted in cost reductions, but some- 
what less than predicted, and five resulted in cost 
reductions greater than predicted (Reference 14). 
D. TECHNICAL READINESS ASSESSMENT FOR 
$2.80/Wp MODULES (1 980) 
The first major milestone of the National Photo- 
voltaics Program was achievement of technical readi- 
ness for a technology capable of producing PV modules 
for sale at $2.80/Wp (1 980 dollars) by the end of FY 82. 
In the summer of 1980, PA&I initiated a detailed assess- 
ment of the status of the developing technology to ascer- 
tain if there existed processes, equipment, and materials 
sufficient to meet this milestone. 
The ground rules of this study were that all equip- 
ment must either have been in use in the industry or 
existed as tested prototypes to ensure that process 
parameters were well understood. Both equipment and 
processes had to be capable of being adopted by 
industry by the end of FY 82 and be capable of pro- 
ducing PV modules for sale at $2.8O/Wp (1 980 dollars) 
or less. 
A Cz ingot-based production sequence was 
chosen for analysis. Wherever possible, actual 
measured parameters were used to minimize assump- 
tions. As with all such economic studies, there was no 
assurance that all the newly developed technology 
would be adopted by industry and collocated in a 
single factory. 
The module fabrication sequence chosen repre- 
sented the best technology ready for adoption at that 
time. The cell and module performance parameters 
chosen had been confirmed by laboratory and field tests 
for cells and modules using that fabrication sequence. 
The factory size was chosen large enough (30 MW/year) 
to capture most economies of scale. This was done to 
ensure that true economic capabilities of the technology 
were not obscured by scale inefficiencies associated 
with small manufacturing operations. 
Results of the study are shown in Table 3 for the 
principal production steps. These results, presented at 
the 16th PIM, September 1980, indicated the technol- 
ogy had been developed to the point where the first 
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major DOE PV Program milestone of $2.8O/Wp 
technology had been met (Reference 15). 
Table 3. Price Summary for Principal Manufac- 
turing Steps for 1982 PV Crystalline- 
Silicon Technology 
Technology Steps $/WD* 
Ingot Growth (including silicon $1.63 
Wafer in g 0.37 
Cell processing 0.36 
Module assembly (including 0.34 
$2.70 
feedstock) 
encapsulation material) 
~~ ~ 
* 1980 dollars. 
In 1982, events of the preceding 2 years were 
reviewed to ascertain the extent to which the forecast of 
potential PV module cost reduction had been realized. 
Ground rules for this review were that all equipment and 
processes had to be in actual use in the PV industry, but 
not necessarily collocated in one manufacturer's plant. 
Results of the review, shown in Table 4, were pre 
sented in January 1983 at the 21 st PIM (Reference 16). 
In comparing the FOB factory dock required prices, the 
capabilities of the actual 1982 technology were slightly 
better than had been projected 2 years earlier. To see 
how the calculated price compared to actual market 
prices, some additional assumptions and adjustments 
had to be made. Marketing and distribution, which are 
not included in the SAMIS model, had to be added. 
Although manufacturers are reluctant to reveal marketing 
and distribution costs, PA&I was able to elicit from manu- 
facturers that the range of 30 to 50% was reasonable. 
Inflation from 1980 to 1982, predicted in the 1980 study 
to be 14.5 % , actually was 25.4 % . 
Table 4. Comparison of the $2.80/Wp Technical Readiness Projection Made in 1980 for 1982 with Actual 1982 
Industrial Practices (Reference 16) 
1982 State of the Arta Projection Made in 1980 for 1982a (1 980$/Wp) (1 980$/Wp) 
30 MW/yr 30 MW/yr 2 MW/yr 
Ingot growth (including silicon) 1.63 1.53 1.74 
Wafering 0.37 0.42 0.77 
Cell processing 0.36 0.31 0.84 
Module assembly (including encapsulation material) 0.34 0.37 0.92 
FOB factory dock required price 2.70 2.63 4.27 
Marketing and distribution (30 to 50%) 0.81 -1.35 0.79-1.31 1.28-2.1 3 
Inflation (1 980-1 982) (1 4.5% estimated, 25.4% actual) 0.89-1.03 0.87-1 .OO 1.41 -1.63 
Required market price,b 1982$/Wp 4.40-5.08 4.29-4.94 6.97-8.03 
aAssumes 11.4% encapsulated-cell efficiency and a 0.78 packing factor 
bTo convert to $/m2 of module, multiply by 89.4. 
When these adjustments were made, the required 
market price of modules in 1982 dollars was in the range 
of $4.29 to $ 4 . 9 4 4 .  In December 1982, 1 month after 
the completion of the study, the winning bid in a competi- 
tive procurement was submitted by a module manufac- 
turer that had adopted most of the technology assumed 
in the study. The bid of $4.95/Wp was for a large num- 
ber of modules to be used by a utility. 
Also included in the study was a calculation of the 
required price of PV modules using the same technology, 
but produced on a much smaller scale of 2 MW/year. 
This scale was typical of most PV module manufac- 
turers at that time. The results for 2 MWlyear, shown 
in Table 4, were in the range of from $7 to $8/Wp 
(1 982 dollars), including marketing and distribution. 
This corresponds very well to the typical selling prices 
for large purchases of PV modules at that time. 
E. JPL/SERI JOINT ASSESSMENT OF 
CRYSTALLINE-SILICON SHEET (1 981) 
In the summer of 1981 , the FSA PA&I was faced 
with an extremely difficult and delicate problem. At the 
request of the DOE PV Program Office, the various 
crystalline sheet options were to be listed in descend- 
ing priority in anticipation of sharp reductions in the 
number of options being funded by DOE. A total of 11 
different options were being pursued by JPL and SERI. 
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Each option had its vocal constituency both within and 
outside the institutions. Also, several sheet options had 
multiple options for ancillary requirements such as saw- 
ing or silicon feedstock. These affected the economic 
and technical viability of the sheet option. Eventually, 
18 different paths were identified for silicon sheet, 
even when assuming commonality wherever possible in 
cell and module processing. 
duct a joint JPL/SERI study and to arrive at a consen- 
sus between the two institutions on recommendations 
for which options should be continued and which should 
be terminated. At that time, for more than a year, PA&I 
had been developing SIMRAND, a decision-aid method- 
ology for application to just such multipleaption prob- 
lems as the silicon sheet study posed by DOE. It was 
decided to apply SIMRAND, described in Section IV of 
this report, to the problem. In part, SIMRAND had its 
origins in the “Tsongas” procurement, a problem similar 
to the priority-rating of silicon sheet options. 
Several preliminary planning meetings were held 
at SERl and JPL to carefully develop the ground rules 
for the study and to familiarize all participants with a 
decision process that formally incorporated uncertainty 
with technical and economic point estimates. At the 
outset, the enthusiasm of the participants for the 
SIMRAND approach varied markedly. As the study 
progressed, however, the value of the process 
became apparent to most of those involved. 
The task facing PA&I was to organize and con- 
The bulk of the data discussions took place in two 
2day meetings at JPL chaired by the PA&I Area Mana- 
ger and supported by PA&I analysts. Each variable 
was discussed for all sheet options. For example, cell 
efficiencies for cells fabricated from each sheet material 
were discussed. A consensus was reached that the effi- 
ciency distributions for each silicon sheet option was 
consistent with the knowledge of that material, and 
consistent relative to the efficiency distributions of 
other sheet options. The discussion then would move to 
the next variable, such as yield, for each of the sheet 
options. This ensured some measure of uniformity in the 
underlying assumptions across all sheet options. Pro- 
ceeding in this manner, consensus was reached for each 
variable for all the sheet options. IPEG calculations were 
performed as needed to support the discussions. 
Cumulative probability distributions were generated 
for each variable. These distributions were entered into 
the SIMRAND computer program. Through a Monte 
Carlo simulation, probability distributions for individual 
variables were combined into a single distribution for 
the cost of the module. Cumulative probability distri- 
butions were generated for each silicon sheet option. 
Although the discussions were highly spirited at times, 
the SIMRAND process, by formally excluding extra- 
neous issues, provided an internal self consistency 
that permitted progress toward a consensus. 
It is noteworthy that consensus was reached on all 
issues. The findings of the joint JPUSERI team were pre 
sented to the DOE PV Program Office and subsequently 
almost all the team’s recommendations were enacted by 
DOE. The results are summarized in an unpublished 
“white paper” report to DOE (Reference 17). 
F. DEVELOPMENT OF “IDENTIFICATION AND 
COSTING OF BASIC PROCESSING UNITS” 
HANDBOOK (1 981 TO 1982) 
With the rapid emergence of new thin-film solar cell 
technologies, it became apparent that a new database of 
information would be needed to evaluate the progress 
and potential of these new technologies. The database 
would cover leading manufacturing processes for thin- 
film solar cell module production. Using the experience 
and database developed through many prior cost- 
assessments for silicon solar cell technology, it was 
shown that the large number of processes that might be 
used could be reduced to a much smaller and manage- 
able list of “basic processing units.” In 1981 , JPL pro- 
posed to develop for SERl a simplified methodology and 
handbook for the rapid, rough estimation of process 
costs based on the use of basic processing units. 
The handbook that resulted from this effort 
(Reference 18) consisted of descriptions and cost 
estimates for the basic processing units identified as 
representative of the manufacturing technology for 
thin-film solar cell modules. The process descriptions 
identified costs by principal categories, making it easy 
to adjust the description and estimate of cost to a 
specific production sequence and technology. The 
most sensitive parameters for individual process costs 
also were singled out, and sensitivity curves were 
generated showing the response of cost to variations 
in this input parameter. With this material, users of the 
handbook quickly can construct a cost estimate of both 
the processes in a PV module fabrication sequence and 
the total cost. Beginning with a process sequence 
description, process costs are taken from the handbook. 
If there are significant changes in the most sensitive 
parameter for the estimate of cost, the estimate can be 
read directly from the sensitivity curve for the process 
parameter. The handbook has proven itself useful in the 
study of manufacturing processes and the development 
of quick estimates of process costs. 
The handbook of “basic processing units” was 
updated in 1986. It was extended to cover promising 
new manufacturing processes for thin-film technolo- 
gies. The basic processing units are available as part 
of the SAMIS package of cost-estimating procedures 
that can be obtained through COSMIC. 
G. SILICON COST ANALYSIS (1 983) 
By the fall of 1983, the polysilicon feedstock 
development task was being phased out of the FSA 
Project. Early in the Project, a contract had been 
issued to an academic institution (Lamar University, 
Beaumont, Texas) to estimate and track the costs of 
silicon from the numerous proposed production methods. 
Many point estimates had been made using standard 
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industrial cost engineering technologies. In 1983, PA&I 
conducted a study of the surviving candidate silicon pro- 
duction methods to assess the capability for producing 
lowcost silicon. This study once again demonstrated the 
value and power of SIMRAND to produce internally con- 
sistent comparisons that are a requirement for sound 
management (Reference 19). 
The siliconcost study applied the SIMRAND tech- 
nique, described in Section IV of this document, to a 
projection of the cost of silicon from future large pro- 
duction plants using technology developed during the 
FSA Project. Inputs to the SIMRAND model were 
based on updates of the Lamar University estimates. 
In SIMRAND, however, probabilities are assigned to 
the point estimates. An immediate result was the dis- 
covery that point estimates for different technologies, 
which previously had been used to compare cost of 
product, had very different probabilities of achieve- 
ment in the opinion of a broad spectrum of experts in 
the field. When compared on an equal probability 
basis, the candidate silicon process in second place 
(the process developed by Hemlock Semiconductor, 
Inc.) became much more cost competitive with the 
Union Carbide leadingcandidate process. 
H. ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF FLOAT-ZONE 
AND CZOCHRALSKI TECHNOLOGY (1 984) 
In 1983, the reorientation of the National Photo- 
voltaics Program toward high-efficiency modules (1 6 % 
and above) prompted a reexamination of options for 
silicon material capable of the required cell efficiencies 
(Reference 20). Among the candidate sheet materials 
proven capable of producing high-efficiency cells was 
the float-zone (FZ) ingot material. 
The FZingot option was briefly examined early in 
the Project. Although it was known that very high crystal 
quality could be obtained with FZ, the state of crystal 
growing technology for Cz was more advanced. The 
semiconductor industry was moving toward largediameter 
Cz ingots, a direction seemingly fortuitous in meeting the 
requirements for photovoltaics. At that early time, the 
goals of the National Photovoltaics Program required 
only a 10% efficient module that could be obtained by 
Cz technology without resorting to the lessdeveloped 
FZ method. Restructuring of the Photovoltaics Pro- 
gram goals to 15% efficient modules, however, put 
stringent requirements on the bulk properties of the sili- 
con wafer material before it starts into the cell processing 
sequence. With further development, Cz material prob- 
ably would be able to meet these requirements, but FZ 
material could fulfill most of the bulk property require- 
ments at that time. Although FZ material was acceptable, 
the crystal production methods require further technology 
development to be acceptable for large-scale manufac- 
turing. 
Under the assumption of equivalent cell efficiencies, 
results of the analysis indicated a slightly lower $/Wp 
and $/m2 cost for a FZ process when compared to a 
Cz-based process. If it is assumed for identical cell 
and module-fabrication sequences that FZ wafers will 
result in a higher cell efficiency than Cz wafers, the 
disparity in the results increase further in favor of FZ. 
A more conservative cost for the polysilicon feedstock 
was used for FZ because of the requirement for feed- 
stock in rod form. 
The principal difference between the assumptions 
for the two technologies was uncertainty in the crystal 
growth parameters. The assumptions for Cz were widely 
reviewed for more than a decade and, for the most part, 
demonstrated in practice. Conversely, FZ crystal growth 
is still very much an art, and technology development 
would be required, with all its attendent uncertainties, to 
fabricate production FZgrowers with the capabilities 
assumed in this study. The payoff for such a develop 
ment effort could be an increase in the absolute 
efficiency of modules. 
I. PARAMETER SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF 
PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS (1 984 TO 1985) 
By 1984, the network of models developed by 
PA&I had been completed. It was possible to trace 
analytically the life cycle of photovoltaics from the 
purification costs of the silicon feedstock through 
crystal growth, cell and module fabrication, installation 
and operation in the field and, ultimately, the decom- 
missioning and salvaging of power plants at end-of-life. 
This powerful set of models allowed one to assess the 
sensitivity, of both life-cycle costs and cost per kWh, 
to changes in cost or performance at any point in the 
manufacture and operation of a PV power plant. By 
1 984, a considerable experimental database had been 
accumulated by module manufacturers and power plant 
operators. Based on these factors, PA&I initiated a major 
sensitivity study of flat-plate PV systems. 
The purpose of the sensitivity study was to pro- 
vide a guide for Program planning and technology 
assessments that would permit a user flexibility over a 
broad spectrum of PV system parameters. Using the 
relationship between lifetime cost and system perform- 
ance parameters, analytical tests were made to see 
how overall PV system energy costs are affected by 
changes in the various goals set for module cost and 
efficiency, system component costs and efficiencies, 
O&M costs, and indirect costs. 
An analysis was made of how the competitiveness 
of PV systems is affected by regional differences in com- 
peting energy costs and solar insolation levels. The sen- 
sitivity of competing energy costs (coal, combustion tur- 
bine, and combined cycle oil-fired generators) to escala- 
tion rates for capital and fuel was explored. Alternative 
tracking configurations (fixed, oneaxis, and two-axis 
tracking) also were introduced into the sensitivity 
analysis. 
Goal values for PV system parameters were 
reviewed on the basis of the most recent research find- 
ings. Sensitivity tests were made to see how research 
progress in areas such as power-related, BOS cost 
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affected the combinations of module cost and module 
efficiency that meet Program goals for system energy 
costs (Reference 21). The results were an extensive set 
of tables that related the sensitivity of important system 
parameters to changes in other system parameters. This 
provides the system designer with insight into the effect 
a specific set of parameters will have on overall system 
economic performance. 
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J. FSA PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
COMPARED TO CHERRY HILL GOALS (1 985) 
In 1985, nearing the end of the FSA Project, a 
study was undertaken to assess the economic conse- 
quences of the technical achievements of the Project 
from its inception. In an internally consistent process, 
these results were compared to the results envisioned 
by the Cherry Hill conferees in 1973. Three of the four 
PA&I managers who served during the life of the Project 
authored a paper presented at the 18th Institute of Elec- 
trical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Photovoltaic 
Specialists Conference (Reference 22). The principal find- 
ings of this study are presented in detail in Section VI of 
this document. 
SECTION VI 
Progress in Crystalline-Silicon Technology 
When the FSA Project was formed in January 1975, 
the PV industry was using some rather expensive 
materials for module manufacturing. The PV industry 
also was small and highly labor-intensive. The FSA 
Project planners envisioned a path that would lead to a 
dramatic decline in the price of terrestrial PV modules, 
from the range of $70 to $1 20/Wp (1 985 dollars) in 
1974, as shown in Figure 7, to the Cherry Hill goal of 
$l.O7/Wp (1 985 dollars) in 1985. 
MODULE COST 
(1 985S/Wp) 
l 1 O I  n 
” 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 ,1984 1986 
CALENDAR YEAR 
Figure 7. State-of-the-Art Projections for 
Czochralski Module Technology (1 974 
to 1985) 
This section reviews the progress made in crystalline- 
silicon technology from 1974 to 1985. The reader should 
be cautioned that the numbers presented here reflect the 
potential of the technology in the limit of high production 
volume, and not the market prices at each point in time.7 
A. CZOCHRALSKI TECHNOLOGY 
Figure 7 displays state-of-the-art Cz technology at 
several points in time.8 The major contributions to prod- 
uct cost are broken out by principal process category.9 
The state-of-the-art factories of Figure 7 assume 
that the most advanced technology available to a man- 
ufacturer at that date is collocated in a single factory 
and scaled-up to a point where most economies-of- 
scale have been captured. This prevents differences 
attributable to scale economies from obscuring eco- 
nomic differences inherent in the technologies. 
As shown in Figure 7, an astounding improvement in 
the state-of-the-art technology took place in the 4 years 
after 1974. By 1978, expensive materials such as sili- 
cone pottants and doubleglass encapsulants were being 
replaced by polyvinyl butyral (PVB) and singleglass con- 
struction. Cz ingots (2- and 3in. diameter) were replaced 
by 4-in.diameter ingots. Module efficiency had improved 
substantially, and cell fabrication and module assembly, 
although still labor intensive, was done on a non- 
automated, assembly-line basis. 
By 1 980, prototype large-scale production equip- 
ment had been developed by contractors to the JPL 
Project. Notable among this equipment were automated, 
largediameter, Czingot growers along with new appa- 
ratus for cell processing, module assembly, and lamina- 
tion. Yield and efficiency improvements reduced all man- 
ufacturing requirements for a given production level. 
New, long-life, inexpensive materials such as ethylene 
vinyl acetate (EVA) were being developed for encapsula- 
tion. A systematic test and failure analysis program at 
JPL allowed industry to avoid many costly failures in the 
field and to rectify quickly those that did occur. The engi- 
neering of the entire array as an integrated structure 
eliminated redundant structural material. 
7This section summarizes the principal findings of a silicon-crystalline study (Reference 22) that were presented at the 
18th IEEE Photovoltaic Specialists Conference in October 1985. The results are not in strict agreement with the IEEE 
study because an estimate of inflation for 1985 (4%) was used in the study. Results presented here use the actual 
1985 rate of inflation (3.7%). 
8“State-of-the-art” refers to technology that has been developed, but is not necessarily used in production. 
9The 1978 and later results are from state-of-the-art SAMICS analysis performed at JPL (References 15 and 16). The 
1974 data are from the “Hearings Before the Subcomittee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representa- 
tives, June 6 and 11, 1974.” The information is presented there as a manufacturing direct cost that is not in a form 
that permits a SAMICS analysis. 
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The cumulative effect of these developments, shown 
in Figure 7, shows how technical advances, combined 
with economies of scale, produce large reductions in 
manufacturing cost. Unfortunately, because of market 
conditions and shifting priorities in the National Photo- 
voltaics Program, actual production levels were in the 
range of 1 to 5 MW/year, well below the level needed to 
capture full economies of scale. Technology transfer had 
also slowed appreciably in recent years. Consequently, 
market prices leveled off well above the price the tech- 
nology was capable of reaching. 
B. STATUS OF CRYSTALLINE-SILICON 
TECHNOLOGY IN 1985 
A more detailed analysis of 1985 state-of-the art 
manufacturing using Cz technology is given in Tables 5 
and 6. All assumed equipment and processes were in 
actual use or existed as production prototypes. Thus, if 
production were to start in 1988, more than 2 years 
would be required for today’s state-of-the art technology 
to be installed in a 25-MW/year factory. Wafering param- 
eters are assumed to continue their moderate improve- 
ment through 1988. The assumed cell and module fabri- 
cation processes already were individually proven in 
the production of modules. Results show that if mod- 
ules of 13.5% efficiency [under standard test condi- 
tions (STC)]10 could be produced, then a price of 
$1.44/Wp (1 985 dollars) or $0.68/Wp (1 974 dollars) 
would be required for profitable operation. When this 
cost and efficiency are used to calculate energy price 
using the methodology and assumptions found in the 
current DOE Five-Year Research Plan, an energy price 
of $0.274/kWh (1 985 dollars) is the result. 
Table 5. Projected Price of Manufactured Module 
Using State-of-the-A rt Czochralski 
Technology 
Process 1985$ 
Silicon material 0.389 
Ingot growth 0.367 
Ingot wafering 0.303 
Cell fabrication 0.207 
Module assembly 0.1 78 
Module price $1.44/Wp (1 985$) 
Energy price (using $0.274/kWh 
baseline parameters of the 
National Photovoltaics 
Program) 
Table 6. Assumptions Used in Module Price 
Analysis: 1985 Czochralski Technology 
Factory size 
Year of production 
Silicon cost 
Crystallization rate 
Ingot diameter 
Wafer thickness and kerf 
Sawing blade plunge rate 
Sawing yield 
Cell size (modified 
square shape) 
Area per cell 
Packing factor (percentage 
of module as solar cells) 
Module size 
Module power 
Encapsulated cell efficiency 
Module efficiency (STC) 
25 MWp/yr 
1988 
$43/kg (1 985$) 
1.5 kg/h (Cz) 
5 in. 
19 mils 
2.0 in./min 
95 % 
9.83 x 9.83 cm 
94.6 cm2 
91.4% 
122x61 c m ( 4 x 2 f t )  
101 w p  
14.8% 
13.5% 
At the time of the Cherry Hill conference, little was 
known about BOS costs for large-scale PV electrical 
generation plants. It was the early 1980s before BOS 
parameters were defined adequately to allow a state- 
ment of the PV goals in more relevant terms of $/kWh 
energy price to the user. 
As stated previously, when the Cherry Hill goals 
for PV modules are combined with the BOS costs and 
financial parameters used in the DOE Five-Year 
Research Plan, the selling price of the energy pro- 
duced by the system is $0.263/kWh (1 985 dollars). 
Comparison of this number with previous calculations, 
shown in Tables 5 and 6, shows that Cz technology, 
for all intents and purposes, fulfilled the technology- 
development part of the Cherry Hill promise. 
C. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CRYSTALLINE- 
SILICON TECHNOLOGY 
As shown in Table 5, more than 70% of the total 
required price for Cz modules in this projection is in 
the production of the unprocessed wafer. This tech- 
nology area still is most in need of cost reduction. Sili- 
con ribbon technologies show considerable promise of 
significantly reducing wafer costs because the sawing 
step is completely eliminated, and some ribbon tech- 
nologies are quite conservative in usage of silicon 
material. Some ribbon materials also are capable of 
producing cells approximately equivalent to Cz in solar 
conversion efficiency. 
1 OMeasured at 25OC, Air Mass 1.5 spectrum, and 1 OO-mW/cm2 insolation. 
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The results of a SAMICS simulation of a possible 
future dendritic web ribbon-based PV factory are shown in 
Tables 7 and 8. The production year assumed is 1992, 
with production costestimates based on present state- 
of-the-art cell and module fabrication techniques, 
scaled up to 25 MW/year. The assumed web growth 
rates of 20 cm2lmin and module efficiency of 13.7% 
reflect projected developments in the technology. The 
resulting price required for profitable operation is 
$l.O2/Wp (1 985 dollars) or $0.49/Wp (1 974 dollars). 
Because the efficiency actually is considerably higher, 
this cost easily beats the original Cherry Hill goal of 
$0.50/W . To approach the current National Photo- 
would have to increase significantly. The effect of den- 
dritic web ribbon growth rates on module production 
cost is shown in Figure 8. As shown, some improvement 
in efficiency and a growth rate of more than 30 cm2/min 
are required to meet the current goal. 
voltaics 1 rogram goals, however, ribbon growth-rates 
Table 7, Projected Price of Manufactured 
Module Using 1992 Dendritic Web 
Technology 
Process 1985$ 
Silicon material 0.1 53 
Web growth 0.341 
Cell formation 0.1 19 
Metallization 0.1 62 
Module assembly 0.244 
Module price $l.O2/Wp (1 985$) 
Energy price (using baseline $0.220/kWh 
parameters of the National 
Photovoltaics Program 
Table 8. Assumptions Used in Module Price 
Analysis: 1992 Dendritic Web 
Technology 
~ ~ 
Factory size 25 MW/yr 
Year of production 1992 
Silicon cost $37/kg (1 985$) 
Web growth rate 20 cm2/min 
Growth machines/operator 18 
Module area 4790 cm2 
Module power 68.2 Wp 
Encapsulated cell efficiency 14.6 % 
Packing factor 94 % 
Module efficiency (STC) 13.7% 
Figure 8 shows the importance of improvements in 
silicon ribbon growth rates. The projected 20cm2/min 
growth rate for 1992 will allow dendritic web tech- 
nology to exceed the original goals set at Cherry Hill. 
Additional research to improve efficiency and increase 
ribbon growth rates to the 30cm2/min range would bring 
module production costs close to current National 
Program goals. 
Subsequent to the 1985 Cz and ribbon studies, 
significant progress has been made in laboratory, 
singlecrystal cell efficiencies. This development is 
especially important because cell efficiencies greater 
than 20% were achieved in relatively large cells (4 cm2). 
This indicates that efficiency assumptions for the 1985 
study were unnecessarily conservative. If laboratory 
techniques for improving efficiency can be successfully 
adapted for industriakcale cell production, then the price 
per watt for crystallinesilicon PV modules would be con- 
siderably less than indicated by the 1985 study. Because 
increases in module efficiency reduce total powerplant 
area-related costs, further increases in cell efficiencies 
would reduce the price per kilowatthour of electricity 
generated. If both laboratory efficiencies can be 
approached in largescale production, and ribbon growth 
rates improved, it is conceivable that the DOE goals can 
be surpassed by crystalline-silicon photovoltaics. 
EFFECT OF WEB GROWTH RATE 
ON MODULE PRODUCTION COSTS (19855) 
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Figure 8. Effect of Web Growth-Rate on Module 
Production Costs (1 985 dollars) 
25 
SECTION VI1 
Lessons and Legacies 
The PA&I activity was the first of its kind at JPL. 
PA&I developed the depth, breadth, and autonomy to 
carry out the broad spectrum of activities involving 
model development, detailed technology assessment, 
and decision analysis required to support the FSA 
Project. PA&I assessment and analysis work provided 
Project management with a solid point of departure for 
folding in the diverse factors such as budgetary, organi- 
zational, and legislative constraints that influence a man- 
agement decision. From this storehouse of experience, 
many lessons were learned that should help any future 
activity of a similar nature to avoid some of the pitfalls, 
failures, and false starts that at times befell FSA PA&. 
Some of the most important lessons learned and the 
legacy left by PA&I are discussed in this section. 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
Choose goals with great care. A properly struc- 
tured project goal can be of great help in providing 
cohesiveness and direction to a project. Conversely, a 
poorly structured goal can be divisive, spawning ineffi- 
cient use of resources and leading to external percep- 
tions of poor progress or failure when, in fact, signifi- 
cant progress is being made. 
Goals should be structured to include only those 
parameters over which the project has some control. 
The FSA Project was a joint Government-industry- 
university effort to develop technology that would later 
be used by a privately scaled-up industry. The extent to 
which that scale-up would occur was completely depen- 
dent on market and financial conditions in industry, over 
which the Project had no control. Consequently, the 
early-stated goal of a 500 MW/year production rate by 
1985 was not an appropriate Project goal. Some criti- 
cism was heard that the Project was failing when the 
500-MW/year goal appropriately was abandoned later. 
It was abandoned in part because analysis showed 
those production levels were not necessary to capture 
economies-of-scale, and because of the realization that 
the industry simply was not going to expand that fast. 
The corrollary lesson is that abandonment of an inap- 
propriate or irrelevant goal will be interpreted in some 
quarters as failure. 
The goal statement of a technologydevelopment 
project, such as FSA, should contain limits of what 
can be accomplished. It was several years into the 
Project before the $0.50/W goal (later updated for 
inflation to $0.70/Wp in 19fO dollars) was consistently 
stated in the correct terms of “developing the tech- 
nology that, if scaled up, would be capable of produc- 
ing PV modules for the FOB price of $0.70/W .” The 
point is that the Project itself was never inten&d to 
actually produce $0.70/Wp modules. Complete suc- 
cess by the Project still would be only an enabling 
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event toward private industry’s implementation of the 
technology. Although the technology may be capable 
of producing $0.7O/Wp modules, the actual market 
price charged by manufacturers for their product 
would be determined by market supply and demand 
conditions. Complete success by the Project in no 
way guaranteed that the private sector would imple- 
ment the technology on a large scale. 
The goal should be structured as a single “bottom- 
line” from which technical and economic sub-goals can 
be derived. Early in the Project, the goals were stated as 
$0.50/Wp and 10% efficient modules. Efficiency entered 
into the original Cherry Hill Conference estimates of what 
would be the necessary efficiency of polycrystalline sili- 
con cell modules to achieve $0.50/Wp. Efficiency is sub 
sumed in any $IWp calculation and at the outset should 
have been left as a free variable, as was $/m2 costs. 
This would permit maximum flexibility in how the 
$OSO/Wp goal was to be achieved. 
The $0.5O/Wp goal, along with the later $0.7O/Wp 
goal, were themselves not especially good “bottom- 
line” goals. They did suffice, however, until 1983 when 
an appropriate goal stated in dollars/kilowatt-hour could 
be structured. By then, sufficient knowledge and agree- 
ment had been acquired regarding system parameters 
involved in the actual building and operation of large- 
scale PV electrical generating plants. This information 
permitted a reasonably well-stated dollardkilowatt-hour 
goal to be made. 
Credibility suffers when the audience has difficulty 
dealing with the complexities of a sophisticated analy- 
sis. During the FSA Project, PA&I developed several 
innovative and highly sophisticated models that were 
at the leading edge of their discipline. These models 
proved highly useful in the internal Project decision- 
making process. The same sophistication that made the 
models so useful, however, became a severe liability 
when attempts were made to convince those unfamiliar 
with rigorous and complex procedures of the discipline 
that the results of the model were valid. 
The contrast between user-acceptance of the 
SAMIS computer model and the IPEG cost-estimation 
algorithm is instructive as an example of this problem. 
SAMIS required the use of a mainframe, time-sharing 
computer, and several days training for the operator to 
gain familiarity with the intricacies of the model’s oper- 
ation. Input data formulation was detailed and tedious. 
The payoff was extraordinary visibility and insight into 
the requirements and costs of the processes being 
examined. Errors in input values or assumptions also 
were readily apparent. The application of SAMIS to PV 
module costing, however, met with vigorous and last- 
ing skepticism. (This remained true despite an exten- 
sive validation process to ensure the validity of the 
results under the input assumptions.) 
IPEG is a linear algorithm that divides the cost into 
five categories and applies standarized coefficients that 
are fixed for each cost category. In fact, the IPEG coeffi- 
cients are derived from the same methodology used in 
the SAMIS computer program. IPEG analysis requires 
virtually the same input data, but IPEG results are some- 
what more subject to undetected input error than SAMIS. 
Still, the IPEG method achieved wide and virtually unques- 
tioned acceptance in the industrial community. The 
method of multiplying direct costs by fixed coefficients 
is simple and widely used in industrial costing. Very 
few inquiries ever were received regarding the origin 
or validity of IPEG coefficients. 
It is clear from the PA&I experience that great cau- 
tion should be exercised when expecting the acceptance 
of innovative methodologies, especially by users whose 
principal interests are not directly associated with the 
methodology or its results. Packaging for ease of user 
accessibility and acceptance should rank just below 
validity in the criteria for any future model develop- 
ment. When disseminating a new and sophisticated 
methodology, much attention and time must be given 
to education of the users and others whose coopera- 
tion is needed to apply the methodology. 
There can be problems in maintaining a first-class 
staff when most products are internally discreet. Because 
of the nature of the PA&I role in supporting Project man- 
agement decision-making, many important PA&I products 
had only very limited circulation and were completely 
invisible to the external observer. This has the effect of 
limiting the future professional prospects of personnel in 
this position when one’s resume consists almost entirely 
of intangibles. The FSA Project was especially fortunate 
in dedication to the Project of some critical members of 
the PA&I staff. There may be no completely satisfactory 
solution to this problem. One possible approach is to 
periodically rotate personnel into more highly visible 
activities with more tangible products. 
An independent assessment group having no stake 
in any specific outcome is highly valuable to project 
management. At the outset of the FSA Project, PA&I 
was created as a Project area on an equal plane with the 
other technical areas of the Project. Equally important, 
PA& was not part of the Project Office and could inter- 
act as peers with other segments of the Project, not as 
representatives of the Project Office. Consequently, PA&I 
was highly successful in acting as the “honest broker” of 
information among various parties. The importance of 
this somewhat subtle point should not be underestimated 
as this seemingly minor organizational construct was 
probably the most enabling factor in the success of the 
PA&I activity. 
B. LEGACIES 
At the outset of the FSA Project in 1975, it became 
apparent that a very large number of technical options, in 
varying degrees of maturity, were available for develop- 
ment. One possible approach would have been to fund a 
broad spectrum of activities )“th only qualitative regard 
to nontechnical factors such as manufacturing cost. The 
FSA Project, however, chose a difficult, uncharted 
course. It set quantifiable, non-technical goals for the end 
result of a complex, long-range development effort where 
each technical option was to be judged on its contribu- 
tion to meeting those goals. It was the task of PA&I to 
devise and implement the process by which the progress 
of the Project could be enhanced and measured. 
Through the years of the Project, PA&I studies have 
documented the history of technical and economic pro- 
gress toward meeting the objectives of the National 
Photovoltaics Program. A framework of goals and guide 
lines was established. A number of innovative and 
sophisticated analytical tools were developed to track 
overall progress and place individual research activi- 
ties within the framework of the goals and guidelines. 
The analyses performed by PA&I provided the quanti- 
tative consistency required for informed management 
decisions. 
Accomplishments of the PA&I activity, discussed 
in Sections Ill, IV, and V of this report, reflect only the 
most tangible of PAM products. Not included is the 
aspect that PA&I became a clearing house for reliable 
information on a broad spectrum of subjects, respond- 
ing frequently to inquiries from Government, industry, 
academia, and private parties. A significant proportion 
of PA&I resources was consumed by the demands of 
information transfer. 
Not all the techniques, methodologies, and 
procedures of the PA&I activity will be applicable or 
appropriate to other technologydevelopment projects. 
Indeed, not all technologydevelopment efforts require 
a PA&I activity. But an analysis and integration activity 
is essential in those cases where a number of competing 
development options must coalesce into an integrated 
technology, viable under both technical and non-technical 
constraints. The legacy of the FSA PA&I activity will be 
the example it provided in enabling the orderly manage- 
ment of a very complex technologydevelopment project. 
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APPENDIX B 
Glossary 
BOS 
CELLOPT 
COSMIC 
c z  
DOD 
DOE 
EFG 
ERDA 
EVA 
FOB 
FSA 
FY 
FZ 
GNP 
I BM-XT 
IEEE 
IPEG 
J PL 
LCP 
LSA 
LSSA 
MEPSDU 
MIT 
balance of system (non-array elements of 
a PV system) 
Cell Optimization Model 
Computer Software Management 
Information Center 
Czochralski (classical siliconcrystal 
growth method) 
U.S. Department of Defense 
U.S. Department of Energy 
edgedefined film-fed growth (silicon- 
ribbon growth method) 
Energy Research and Development 
Administration 
ethylene vinyl acetate 
free on board 
Flat-Plate Solar Array Project 
fiscal year 
float-zone (silicon sheet growth method) 
Gross National Product 
International Business Machines, XT 
computer model 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers, Inc. 
Improved Price Estimation Guidelines 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Lifetime Cost and Performance 
Low-Cost Solar Array (Project) 
Low-Cost Silicon Solar Array (Project) 
module experimental process system 
development unit 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MYPP 
NASA 
NSF 
O&M 
OTA 
PAG 
PA&I 
PC 
PIM 
P PG 
PRDA 
PURPA 
PV 
PVB 
RANN 
R&D 
SAMICS 
SAMIS 
SAMPEG 
SERl 
SIMRAND 
SNL 
STC 
Multiyear Program Plan 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
National Science Foundation 
operation and maintenance 
Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment 
Price Allocafion Guidelines 
Project Analysis and Integration Area (of 
FSA) 
personal computer 
Project Integration Meeting 
Program Planning Group 
Program Research and Development 
Announcement 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, PL95-617 
photovoltaic(s) 
polyvinyl butyral 
Research Applied to National Needs 
research and development 
Solar Array Manufacturing Industry 
Costing Standards 
Standard Assembly-Line Manufacturing 
Industry Simulation 
Solar Array Manufacturing Price 
Estimation Guidelines 
Solar Energy Research Institute 
SlMulation of Research ANd Development 
Projects 
Sandia National Laboratory 
standard test conditions 
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The JPL Flat-Plate Solar Array Project is sponsored by the U.S. Department of 
Energy and is part of the National Photovoltaics Program to initiate a major 
effort toward the development of cost-competitive solar arrays. 
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the 
United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any 
agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or 
implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, com- 
pleteness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. 
Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade 
name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or 
imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States 
Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions o f  authors expressed 
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government 
or any agency thereof. 
More Technology Advancements 
Dendritic web silicon ribbons are grown to solarcell 
thickness. Progress is shown by experimental ribbons 
grown in 1976 and 1978 and a ribbon grown in a 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation pilot plant. 
INGOT GROWN 
USING SILICON MELT 
REPLENISHMENT 
Czochralski silicon crystals as grown are 
sa wed into thin circular wafers. (Support for 
this effort was completed in 1981 .) 
Prototype modules have passed UL 790 Class A 
burning brand tests which are more severe than 
this spread of flame test. 
I 
z / 
The edgedefined film-fed growth silicon ribbons are 
grown to solarcell thickness. A DOEIFSA-sponsored 
research ribbon grown in 1976 is shown next to a 
nine-sided ribbon grown in a Mobil Solar Energy 
Corporation funded configuration. 
GLASS ISTRUCTURALI 
SPACER 
POTTANT 
SOLAR CELLS- 
INTERCONNECTED - SPACER 
I] POTTANT 
,- BACK COVER FILM 
ICOMPOSlTEl 
Typical superstrate module design is shown with the 
electrically interconnected solar cells embedded in a 
laminate that is structurally supported by glass. 
Materials and processes suitable for mass production 
have been developed using this laminated design. 
A 15.2% efficiency prototype module (21 x 36 in.) 
was made by Spire Corp. using float-zone silicon 
wafers. Recently, similarly efficient modules were 
fabricated from Czochralski silicon wafers. 
Photovoltaic Applications 
197 
buoy 
,owered 
Photovoltaic-powered corrosion protection 
of underground pipes and wells. 
Later.. . 
House in Carlisle, Massachusetts, with a 7.3-kW 
photovoltaic rooftop array. Excess photovoltaic- 
generated power is sold to the utility. Power is 
automatically supplied by the utility as needed. 
1985 
f 
A 28-kW array of solar cells for crop irrigation 
during summer, and crop drying during winter 
(a DOEIUniversity of Nebraska cooperative project) 
1.2 MW of photovoltaic peaking-power generation 
capacity for the Sacramento Municipal Utility District. 
(The 8 x 16 ft panels are mounted on a north-south 
axis for tracking the sun.) 
